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Communication Systems

ARP

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Internet Working

Extensions: VLAN tagging and QoS

- ▶ **VLANs a means for complete virtualisation of broadcast domains**
 - Same characteristics as physical LAN, but allowing end stations to be grouped together independent of network switch location
 - Major advantage: reconfiguration done via switch software configuration instead of physically relocating hardware / changing cabling
 - Segmentation service traditionally provided by routers in a LAN
- Provides a mean to expedite time-critical network traffic by setting transmission priorities for outgoing frames
- Bridges and switches filter destination addresses and forward VLAN frames only to ports that serve the VLAN to which the traffic belongs
- Multiple layer 3 networks within the same physical LAN


Extensions: VLAN tagging and QoS

- ▶ VLAN 802.1q tagging is a MAC option that provides capabilities not previously available to classical Ethernet networks (defined since Fast Ethernet standards)
- ▶ VLAN standard deploys internal tagging process modifying the Ethernet frame adding a 4 byte header extension
 - 2-byte tag protocol identifier (TPID)
 - plus 2-byte tag control information (TCI)
- TPID has a fixed value of 0x8100 indicating the frame is carrying 802.1q/802.1p tag
- TCI contains:
 - 3-bit user priority
 - 1-bit canonical format indicator (CFI)
 - 12-bit VLAN identifier (VID) – Uniquely identifies the VLAN the frame belongs to

Internet Working

Extensions: VLAN handling

- ▶ If the MAC is installed in a switch port, the frame is forwarded according to its priority level to all ports that are associated with the indicated VLAN identifier
- ▶ If the MAC is installed in an end station, it removes the 4-byte VLAN header and processes the frame in the same manner as a basic data frame



Internet Working

Extensions: VLAN handling

- ▶ VLANs violate the old MTU restriction of 1518 Byte producing packets with a MTU of 1522 Byte
- ▶ Application:
 - Static – port based configuration: All machines connected to a port are in the same VLAN (invisible to them), standard scenario in campus setup
 - All VLAN tags added by these stations are silently dropped in switch (thus a reconfiguration of local device was required for producing the proper playground for the exercises)
 - Dynamic – using special software to create VLAN automatically e.g. grouping on source MAC address (e.g. putting all IP telephones in a specific LAN with higher forwarding priority)

Communication Systems

Ethernet and IP

- ▶ Flat addressing scheme of physical/data link layer
Ethernet
- ▶ Why two addresses for a LAN connected host?
- ▶ IP addressing – higher layer, to overcome the flat addressing restrictions: routed/hierarchical
 - Changing places of many hosts (e.g. your laptop: connected at home to Ethernet and to different WLANs throughout the day, but the physical addresses of your machine do not change)
 - Manual setup/configuration needed (today's practical)
- ▶ How to encapsulate IP datagram within link-layer frame

Ethernet and IP


- ▶ What low level destination (MAC) address to use?
- ▶ Helper protocol is needed
 - IP has no feature to do mapping itself
 - Such mapping is not needed in PPP environments
 - This protocol is specific to the underlying hardware / software protocol
- ▶ Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is for address mapping in Ethernets (and TokenRings, ATM, ...)
 - Fairly old protocol around for a while (RFC 826)

IP to MAC and vice versa

- ▶ Address Mapping: IP to MAC – to get the host where to deliver a given packet locally
- ▶ Simple solution could just broadcast everything (and every machine listens to everything)
 - Unnecessary, burdens uninterested stations with others' traffic, congests the network
- ▶ IP to MAC address mapping mechanisms
 - Configured by hand [cumbersome]
 - Dynamic [learned by system automatically]
- ▶ Address Mapping IP to MAC: Learning

Address Mapping in Broadcast Nets

- ▶ **But what to do in broadcast nets with many connected hosts?**
 - In broadcast nets every host gets every packet sent out in the segment (switching may reduce traffic, but for some services packets to all are inevitable)
- ▶ **For local delivery, need to map network-layer address to link-layer address:**
 - Consider the machines 132.230.15.6 and 132.230.15.18 (netmask e.g. 255.255.255.0) ... [on same network/subnet]



Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)

- ▶ Dynamic approach
 - Each station runs Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
 - Client/server architecture, each station is both client and server, routers have to implement the same mechanism too
 - Cache lookups with timeouts on each resolution
- ▶ Introduction of an intermediate protocol – operating between layer 2 & 3
- ▶ Address Resolution Protocol is basically address independent (at both network & link layer)
- ▶ Protocol is specialized for each particular network/link address pairing

ARP


- ▶ The term address resolution refers to the process of finding an address of a computer in a network
- ▶ Address is "resolved" using a protocol in which a piece of information is sent by a client process executing on the local computer to a server process executing on a remote computer
- ▶ The information received by the server allows the server to uniquely identify the network system for which the address was required and therefore to provide the required address
- ▶ Procedure is completed when the client receives a response from the server containing the required address

ARP operation

▶ Step-by-Step operation


- 0 - Requesting station A has IP address I, wants the associated MAC address M
- 1 – Check the own ARP cache
- 2 - A broadcasts the query: who has I? tell A
- 3 – B adds MAC for A to its cache
- 4 - Machine assigned address I responds directly to A with its MAC address M
- 5 - A adds the (I,M) entry to its ARP cache

ARP operation cont.




ARP on ethernet with IP payload

- ▶ Common example is Ethernet/IPv4 (look at Ethernet/IPv6 in wireshark in upcoming practical)
- ▶ Ethernet MAC: 6Byte (48bit), IPv4: 4Byte (32bit), IPv6: 16Byte (128bit)



ARP on ethernet with IP payload cont.

- ▶ ARP frames marked with Frame Type 0x0806
- ▶ IPv4 frames marked 0x0800 (wireshark exercise)
- ▶ Ethernet frame on wire with all headers and ARP payload



ARP cache table (example)

- ▶ Contains hostname or IP address, hardware type, MAC, flag (c for cached), interface (use of arp or ip neighbor commands presented in experimental part of the course)


```
$  
$ /sbin/arp  
Address                HWtype  HWaddress           Flags Mask           Iface  
npserver2.ruf.uni-freibur ether    00:09:6B:00:41:78   C                   eth0  
fs1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de ether    00:02:B3:4C:57:23   C                   eth0  
mbone.ruf.uni-freiburg. ether    08:00:20:88:96:76   C                   eth0  
b1-9.ruf.uni-freiburg.d ether    00:09:6B:00:40:DA   C                   eth0  
npserver4.ruf.uni-freibur ether    00:09:6B:00:41:BC   C                   eth0  
b1-8.ruf.uni-freiburg.d ether    00:09:6B:00:26:CF   C                   eth0  
login9.ruf.uni-freiburg ether    00:09:6B:00:3F:8D   C                   eth0  
npserver1.ruf.uni-freibur ether    00:02:B3:4C:57:37   C                   eth0  
132.230.1.254          ether    00:09:97:30:3A:14   C                   eth0  
mawa.ruf.uni-freiburg.d ether    00:02:B3:B5:04:9A   C                   eth0  
b2-7.ruf.uni-freiburg.d ether    00:09:6B:00:41:72   C                   eth0  
b2-6.ruf.uni-freiburg.d ether    00:09:6B:00:40:4E   C                   eth0  
b2-8.ruf.uni-freiburg.d ether    00:09:6B:00:3B:08   C                   eth0  
b1-6.ruf.uni-freiburg.d ether    00:09:6B:00:41:88   C                   eth0  
b1-7.ruf.uni-freiburg.d ether    00:09:6B:00:54:B6   C                   eth0  
ldap1.ruf.uni-freiburg. ether    00:02:B3:4C:4D:5B   C                   eth0  
$ █
```

Security in ARP and Ethernet

- ▶ This lecture, first glimpse on security issues in broadcast networks using ARP
 - Traditional Ethernet uses shared medium – every packet is seen by every station, same applies to every wireless technology (okay – not every mobile station (phone) sees the messages of the others, but it is easy to “wiretap”)
 - Address Resolution Protocol is dynamic – Ethernets are “plug&play” because of ARP
 - ARP (and other protocols like DHCP – handled in a later lecture) needs to broadcast for station discovery
 - All exchanged messages are plain and not secured by any cryptographic methods (we might look at layer 2 security implementations for WLAN like WEP in a later lecture)

ARP Problems

- ARP is a very simple protocol (from the mid 1980s) – thus open to attacks
 - Remember ARP operation: Broadcast of information, no authentication of packets
 - Filling of the ARP cache completely depends on trust on the messages seen



ARP Problems

- ▶ We talked of “how switches secure Ethernets” in the beginning
 - Promiscuous mode of the hosts Ethernet adapter does not show the other packets any more
 - Communication between the default gateway (the Internet) and an arbitrary end system in a switched Ethernet is not visible to third party
 - But what to do to get access to packets exchanged between other stations in the net?
- ▶ ARP helps in packet routing by matching MACs to IP addresses
 - ARP cache is valid for a while, but not for ever (for obvious reasons)
 - If the relation is changed, IP packets will be delivered to the changed address

ARP Problems


- ▶ Thus ARP could be used to force rerouting of IP packets
- ▶ So try this – send unsolicited ARP replies
 - Receiving system will cache the reply
 - Overwrites existing entry
 - Adds entry if one does not exist
- ▶ Why should systems cache replies for requests never seen?

ARP Problems

- ▶ Question of protocol design
 - Host C (in example of two slides before) could update its ARP cache from packets meant for other hosts – without further interaction the cache entries for certain hosts are up to date
 - Even if request is needed for adding an entry to ARP list, the reply of wrong host might be faster than of default router (or any other machine)
 - Just overload that system with bogus packets
- ▶ Flood the network with forged ARP replies, so other machines update their cache regularly with wrong entries

ARP Problems

- ▶ General idea: ARP could be used to force rerouting of IP packets, that communication between the Internet and 132.230.4.49 becomes visible to machine 132.230.4.46



ARP Problems

- ▶ Target 132.230.4.49, attacker 132.230.4.46, default route is 132.230.4.254 (using arpspoof here)

The screenshot shows a terminal window with a menu bar (File, Sessions, Settings, Help) and a status bar (New, Konsole, Shell). The terminal output is as follows:

```
Version: 2.4
Usage: arpspoof [-i interface] [-t target] host
snickers:/home/projekt# arpspoof -i eth0 -t 132.230.4.49 132.230.4.254
0:c:6e:15:3:d 0:2:b3:87:53:43 0806 42: arp reply 132.230.4.254 is-at 0:c:6e:15:3
:d
0:c:6e:15:3:d 0:2:b3:87:53:43 0806 42: arp reply 132.230.4.254 is-at 0:c:6e:15:3
:d
0:c:6e:15:3:d 0:2:b3:87:53:43 0806 42: arp reply 132.230.4.254 is-at 0:c:6e:15:3
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:d
0:c:6e:15:3:d 0:2:b3:87:53:43 0806 42: arp reply 132.230.4.254 is-at 0:c:6e:15:3
:d
0:c:6e:15:3:d 0:2:b3:87:53:43 0806 42: arp reply 132.230.4.254 is-at 0:c:6e:15:3
:d
0:c:6e:15:3:d 0:2:b3:87:53:43 0806 42: arp reply 132.230.4.254 is-at 0:c:6e:15:3
:d
0:c:6e:15:3:d 0:2:b3:87:53:43 0806 42: arp reply 132.230.4.254 is-at 0:c:6e:15:3
:d
0:c:6e:15:3:d 0:2:b3:87:53:43 0806 42: arp reply 132.230.4.254 is-at 0:c:6e:15:3
:d
```


ARP Problems

- ▶ Wireshark capture of packets (as seen on the attacker machine 132.230.4.46 – sees the http connections of 132.230.4.49)

The screenshot shows a Wireshark capture of network traffic. The main pane displays a list of packets with the following columns: No., Time, Source, Destination, Protocol, and Info.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
343	115.378035	132.230.4.49	212.162.1.196	HTTP	GET /icons/rediff_mail_gold/offer6_191202.jp:
346	115.387109	132.230.4.49	212.162.1.196	HTTP	GET /icons/rediff_mail_gold/offer7_191202.jp:
347	115.387113	132.230.4.49	212.162.1.196	HTTP	GET /icons/rediff_mail_gold/offer7_191202.jp:
360	115.400296	132.230.4.49	212.162.1.196	HTTP	GET /icons/rediff_mail_gold/offer8_191202.jp:
361	115.400301	132.230.4.49	212.162.1.196	HTTP	GET /icons/rediff_mail_gold/offer8_191202.jp:
223	98.771971	lsfks06.ruf.uni-freib	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
230	98.958253	lsfks06.ruf.uni-freib	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
235	99.138952	lsfks06.ruf.uni-freib	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
265	110.792163	lsfks06.ruf.uni-freib	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
271	111.465685	lsfks06.ruf.uni-freib	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
274	111.474995	lsfks06.ruf.uni-freib	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
277	111.477620	lsfks06.ruf.uni-freib	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
280	111.953398	lsfks06.ruf.uni-freib	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
293	114.734616	lsfks06.ruf.uni-freib	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
300	115.080127	lsfks06.ruf.uni-freib	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect

The packet details pane for frame 292 (952 on wire, 952 captured) shows the following layers:

- Ethernet II
- Internet Protocol, Src Addr: 132.230.4.49 (132.230.4.49), Dst Addr: 212.162.1.196 (212.162.1.196)
- Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 33041 (33041), Dst Port: www (80), Seq: 3205239940, Ack: 3207970319, Len: 886
- Hypertext Transfer Protocol

The packet bytes pane shows the raw data in hexadecimal and ASCII:

```

0000  00 0c 6e 15 03 0d 00 02  b3 87 53 43 08 00 45 00  ..n.... ..SC..E.
0010  03 aa 21 d6 40 00 40 06  b5 fa 84 e6 04 31 d4 a2  ..!.@.@. ....1..
0020  01 c4 81 11 00 50 bf 0c  14 84 bf 35 be 0f 80 18  ....P.. ...5....
0030  33 e4 be 96 00 00 01 01  08 0a 00 0f 2c 37 12 67  3..... ....7.g
0040  c3 17 47 45 54 20 2f 69  63 6f 6e 73 2f 72 65 64  ..GET /i cons/red
  
```

The bottom of the window shows the Filter: field, a Reset button, an Apply button, and the status: File: <capture> Drops: 0.

ARP Problems

- ▶ Ominous ICMP redirect messages on the target (132.230.4.49) of this attack (ICMP special helper protocol)

The screenshot shows a Wireshark capture of network traffic. The main pane displays a list of packets, with packet 462 highlighted in blue. Packet 462 is an ICMP Redirect message from source 132.230.4.46 to destination 132.230.4.49. The lower pane shows the details of this packet, including Ethernet II, Internet Protocol, and Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) fields. The ICMP field shows a Redirect message type. The bottom pane shows the raw packet data in hexadecimal and ASCII.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
763	137.609978	203.199.83.131	132.230.4.49	HTTP	Continuation
392	92.584438	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
398	92.770804	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
403	92.951430	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
453	104.605446	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
460	105.278992	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
462	105.288306	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
465	105.290930	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
468	105.766738	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
544	108.548232	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
553	108.893678	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
561	109.142862	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
636	109.255395	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
641	109.412522	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect
708	125.015393	132.230.4.46	132.230.4.49	ICMP	Redirect

Frame 462 (105 bytes on wire, 105 bytes captured)
 Ethernet II, Src: 00:0c:6e:15:03:0d, Dst: 00:02:b3:87:53:43
 Internet Protocol, Src Addr: 132.230.4.46 (132.230.4.46), Dst Addr: 132.230.4.49 (132.230.4.49)
 Internet Control Message Protocol

```

0000  00 02 b3 87 53 43 00 0c 6e 15 03 0d 08 00 45 c0  ....SC.. n....E.
0010  00 5b 5a 01 00 00 40 01 0d b6 84 e6 04 2e 84 e6  .[Z...@. ....
0020  04 31 05 01 48 1d 84 e6 04 fe 45 00 00 3f 2a f1  .1..H... .E..?*.
0030  40 00 40 11 38 f7 84 e6 04 31 84 e6 c8 c8 80 38  @.8... .1.....8
0040  00 35 00 2b 2b 87 c2 93 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00  .5.++... ..
  
```

ARP Problems

- ▶ This concept of attack is called ARP poisoning
- ▶ You will try this in the exercise using ettercap or arpoison
 - Similar are dsniff, hunt, ...
- ▶ But beware – detection of tampering with ARP is easily detectable
 - Identify non-standard ARP- replies versus acceptable ones
 - Timeout issues, possibility of lost/dropped packets during setup and shutdown of ARP based redirect
- ▶ Security measures: Track and maintain ARP/IP pairings
 - Tools like arpwatch, snifftest, promisc, snort ...

ARP Problems

- ▶ Counter measures
 - Many OS allow for ARP caching to be made static instead of timing out every several minutes
 - Special treatment of router MAC addresses (do not allow update of this MAC, but of all others in network)
- ▶ Use static ARP entries
 - Option in special zones like DMZ with few servers and a rather static network setup
 - Otherwise: Who maintains lists of IPs and MACs?
- ▶ Or: use network or session layer encryption and authentication
- ▶ Does not help against spoofing, but attacks are less harmful (concept of the local WLAN)

ARP Special Scenarios

- ▶ ARP might be used in some special scenarios
- ▶ Proxy ARP
 - LAN extension: One machine responds to ARP requests in behalf of others
 - Network setup/configuration option
 - Can be used to hide underlying router infrastructure
- ▶ Reverse ARP (RARP)
 - Bootstrap method – machine starts without IP address
 - Send an ARP request for own IP address
 - Tells if address is already in use, also updates other's tables for own address
 - Mostly deprecated (replaced by DHCP – some future lecture)



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