ALBERT-LUDWIGS-
UNIVERSITÄT FREIBURG

Communication Systems

SSL

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Organization

- I. Data and voice communication in IP networks
- **II. Security issues in networking**
- III. Digital telephony networks and voice over IP

Network Security Goals

- **Confidentiality**: only sender, intended receiver should "understand" message contents
  - sender encrypts message
  - receiver decrypts message
  - Privacy: hide `who is doing what with whom`
- **Authentication**: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each other
- **Integrity**: sender, receiver want to ensure messages are not altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection
- **Access and Availability**: services must be accessible and available to users

Network Security on Different Layers

- Security measures could be hooked to different layers of the stack
  - Link layer: one `hop` (e.g. wireless link)
  - IP Layer (IP-Sec): transparent to application (next Friday)
  - Transport Layer (SSL/TLS): easy, widely used
  - Application Layer (PGP, S/MIME)



SSL (Secure Socket Layer)

- Transport layer security service, yields secure channel
  - Secure byte stream
  - Optional public-key server authentication
  - Optional client authentication
- Development started by Netscape to offer secure Internet business
  - Used/Implemented with HTTP first (HTTPS, port 443)
  - Hash: combined MD5 & SHA
  - Encryption: Diffie Helman, RSA & DES, RC4
- Version 3 designed with public input; subsequently became Internet standard TLS (Transport Layer Security)

SSL (Secure Socket Layer)

- Uses TCP to provide a reliable end-to-end service
  - Not restricted for secure web (HTTP) transactions
  - Useful for any TCP based service to be secured: HTTP, IMAP, POP, NNTP, telnet, telephony signaling

- SSL implements two layers of protocols
- SSL session
  - Association between client & server
  - Created by the Handshake Protocol
  - Define a set of cryptographic parameters
  - May be shared by multiple SSL connections

SSL (Secure Socket Layer)

- **SSL connection**
  - A transient, peer-to-peer, communications link
  - Associated with one SSL session



SSL record protocol



- **Confidentiality** – the handshake protocol defines a shared key for encryptions of SSL payloads
  - Using symmetric encryption with a shared secret key defined by Handshake Protocol
  - stateful protocol
- IDEA, RC2-40, DES-40, DES, 3DES, Fortezza, RC4-40, RC4-128
- Message is compressed before encryption

SSL record protocol and format

- The record format leads to
- **Message Integrity** – the handshake protocol defines a shared key used to form message authentication code (MAC)
  - Similar to HMAC but with different padding



SSL MAC calculation

- Hash(MAC_secret_key || pad2 || hash(MAC_secret_key || pad1 || seqNum || SSLcompressed.type || SSLcompressed.length || SSLcompressed.fragment))
- Where:
  - Mac_secret_key –
  - pad1 = 0x36 repeated 48 times for MD5 40 times for SHA-1
  - pad2 = 0x5C repeated …
  - SSLcompressed.type = the higher level protocol used to process this fragment

SSL encryption

- Fragment size 2^{14} = 16384 bytes
  - Compression must be lossless and must not increase length more than 1024
  - No compression algorithm specified in SSLv3 – default no compression
  - Block Cipher Encryption Methods
    - IDEA (128) RC2-40, DES-40, DES (56), 3DES (168)
  - Stream Cipher Encryption choices
    - RC4-40, RC4-128

SSL payload / Change Cipher Specification Protocol

- Change Cipher Spec Protocol
  - consists of a single message of a single byte with value 1
  - it means copy pending state to current state



SSL Alert Protocol

- Conveys SSL-related alerts to peer entity
- Severity
  - Warning or fatal: 1=warning, 2=fatal
- Specific alert
  - Unexpected message, bad record mac, decompression failure, handshake failure, illegal parameter
  - Close notify, no certificate, bad certificate, unsupported certificate, certificate revoked, certificate expired, certificate unknown
- Compressed and encrypted like all SSL data

SSL Handshake Protocol

- Most complex part of SSL
  - Allows the server and client to authenticate each other
  - Negotiate encryption, MAC algorithm and cryptographic keys
  - Used before any application data are transmitted
- Message Fields
  - Type (8)
  - Length (24)
  - Content (≥ 1 byte) parameters
- Several Message types

SSL Handshake Protocol – message types

- Message types (name (value)):
  - Hello-request (null)
  - Client-hello (version,random(32B), sessionID, cipher suite, compression method)
  - Server_hello (same as Client-hello)
  - Certificate (chain of X.509v3 certificates)
  - Server_key_exchange (parameters, signature)
  - Certificate_request (type, authorities)
  - Server_done (null)
  - Certificate_verify (signature)
  - Client_key_exchange (parameters, signature)
  - Finished (hash value)

SSL Handshake Protocol

- Colored messages are optional
- Phase 1-3 messages are plaintext



SSL Handshake Protocol – Phase 1

- Establish security capabilities
  - Client_hello
    - Version = highest SSL understood by client
    - Random 32 bit time stamp + 28 random bytes (secure random number generator)
    - sessionID: 0 to establish new connection, non-zero means update parameters of an existing session
    - Ciphersuite: sequence of cryptographic algorithms in decreasing order of preference (key exchange + CipherSpec)
    - Compression methods: sequence of compression methods

SSL Handshake Protocol – Phase 1

- Establish security capabilities
  - Server_hello is sent back
    - same as from client but confirmation to suggested values:
    - Highest common version, new random field, same sessionID if nonzero, new sessionID otherwise, the selected ciphersuite and the selected compression technique
- Key Exchange methods
  - RSA – secret key is encrypted with receiver's RSA public key
  - Fixed Diffie-Hellman
  - Ephemeral Diffie Hellman
  - Anonymous Diffie-Hellman
  - Fortezza

SSL Handshake Protocol – Phase 1

- CipherSpec follows containing the fields
  - Cipher algorithm
  - MAC algorithm
  - CipherType: block or stream
  - Hash size: 0, 16 for MD5 or 20 for SHA-1 bytes
  - Key material – sequence of bytes used to generate keys
  - IV size of Initial Value for Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

SSL Handshake Protocol – Phase 2

- Server Authentication and Key Exchange
- Server sends
  - Certificate: X.509 certificate chain (not required for anonymous Diffie-Hellman)
  - Server_key_exchange (not always need e.g. fixed Diffie-Hellman) - Hash(Client_hello.random|| ServerHello.random||ServerParms)
  - Certificate_request: certificate type and certificate authorities
  - Server_hello_done: I'm done and I'll wait on response

SSL Handshake Protocol – Phase 3

- Client Authentication and Key Exchange
- Client verifies server certificate and checks the server hello paramters
  - If not in list of CAs, may trust the new certificate
  - Client generates 48 byte pre-secret
- Client sends
  - pre-secret encrypted w/ server's public key in certificate
  - Certificate: if requested, client_key_exchange message must be sent
  - Certificate_verify message to provide explicit verification of client certificate
  - Session key now generated from master secret and client hello random provides "salt"

SSL Handshake Protocol – Phase 4, 5

- Finishing up: switch to next cipher_spec
- Client sends
  - Change_cipher_spec message
  - Finished message under new algorithms, keys (new cipher_spec)
- Server answers
  - Change_cipher_spec message
  - Finished message under new algorithms, keys (new cipher_spec)
- Phase 5: Now encrypted application data could be exchanged between both parties

SSL Version 3 and Transport Layer Security

- IETF standard RFC 2246 similar to SSLv3
- With minor differences
  - in record format version number
  - uses HMAC for MAC
  - a pseudo-random function expands secrets
  - has additional alert codes
  - some changes in supported ciphers
  - changes in certificate negotiations
  - changes in use of padding

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